We i n vestigate the outsourcing of numerical and scienti c computations using the following framework: A customer who needs computations done but lacks the computational resources computing power, appropriate software, or programming expertise to do these locally, w ould like to use an external agent to perform these computations. This currently arises in many practical situations, including the nancial services and petroleum services industries. The outsourcing is secure if it is done without revealing to the external agent either the actual data or the actual answer to the computations. The general idea is for the customer to do some carefully designed local preprocessing disguising of the problem and or data before sending it to the agent, and also some local postprocessing of the answer returned to extract the true answer. The disguise process should be as lightweight as possible, e.g., take time proportional to the size of the input and answer. The disguise preprocessing that the customer performs locally to hide" the real computation can change the numerical properties of the computation so that numerical stability m ust be considered as well as security and computational performance. We present a framework for disguising scienti c computations and discuss their costs, numerical properties, and levels of security. We show that no single disguise technique is suitable for a broad range of scienti c computations but there is an array of disguises techniques available so that almost any scienti c computation can be disguised at a reasonable cost and with very high levels of security. These disguise techniques can be embedded in a very high level, easy-to-use system problem solving environment that hides their complexity.
Outsourcing is a general procedure employed in the business world when one entity, the customer, chooses to farm out outsource a certain task to an external entity, the agent. The reasons for the customer to outsource the task to the agent can be many, ranging from a lack of resources to perform the task locally to a deliberate choice made for nancial or response time reasons. Here we consider the outsourcing of numerical and scienti c computations, with the added twist that the problem data and the answers are to be hidden from the agent who is performing the computations on the customer's behalf. That is, it is either the customer who does not wish to trust the agent with preserving the secrecy of that information, or it is the agent who insists on the secrecy so as to protect itself from liability because of accidental or malicious e.g., by a bad employee disclosure of the con dential information.
The current outsourcing practice is to operate in the clear", that is, by revealing both data and results to the agent performing the computation. One industry where this happens is the nancial services industry, where the proprietary data includes the customer's projections of the likely future evolution of certain commodity prices, interest and in ation rates, economic statistics, portfolio holdings, etc. Another industry is the energy services industry, where the proprietary data is mostly seismic, and can be used to estimate the likelihood of nding oil or gas if one were to drill in a particular geographic area. The seismic data is so massive that doing matrix computations on such large data arrays is beyond the computational resources of even the major oil service companies, which routinely outsource these computations to supercomputing centers.
We consider many science and engineering computational problems and investigate various schemes for outsourcing to an outside agent a suitably disguised version of the computation in a way that hides the customer's information from the agent and yet the answers returned by the agent can be used to obtain easily the true answer. The local computations should be as minimal as possible and the disguise should not degrade the numerical stability of the computation.
The Di erence Between Disguise and Encryption
The techniques presented here di er from what is found in the cryptography literature concerning this kind of problem. Secure outsourcing in the sense of ? follows an information-theoretic approach, leading to elegant negative results about the impossibility of securely outsourcing computationally intractable problems. In contrast, our methods are geared towards scienti c computations that may be solvable in polynomial time, e.g., solution of a linear system of equations or where time complexity is unde ned e.g., the work to solve a partial di erential equation is not related to the size of the text strings that de ne the problem. In addition, the cryptographic protocols literature contains much that is reminiscent of the framework of the present proposal, with many elegant protocols for cooperatively computing functions without revealing information about the functions' arguments to the other party cf. the many references in, for example, ?, ? . The framework of the privacy homomorphism approach that has been proposed in the past ? assumes that the outsourcing agent is used as a permanent repository of the data, performing certain operations on it and maintaining certain predicates, whereas the customer needs only to decrypt the data from the external agent's repository to obtain from it the real data. Our framework is di erent in the following ways:
The customer is not interested in keeping data permanently with the outsourcing agent; instead, the customer only wants to use temporarily its superior computational resources. The customer has some local computing power that is not limited to encryption and decryption. However, the customer does not wish to do the computation locally, perhaps because of the lack of computing power or appropriate software or perhaps because of economics.
Our problem is also reminiscent of the server-aided computation work in cryptography, but there most papers deal with modular exponentiations and not with numerical computing ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ? .
Our problems and techniques a ord us as will be apparent below the exibility of using onetime-pad kinds of schemes for disguise. For example, when we disguise a numberx by adding to it a random value r, then we do not re-use that same r to disguise another numbery we generate another random number for that purpose. If we hide a vector of such x's by adding to each a randomly generated r, then we h a ve to be careful to use a suitable distribution for the r's. Throughout this paper when we use random numbers, random matrices, random permutations, random functions e.g., polynomials, splines, etc., with random coe cients etc.; it is always assumed that each is generated independently of the others, and that quality random number generation is used cf. ?, Chap. 23 , ?, Chap. 12 , ?, ?, ? .
The parameters, types, and seeds of these generators provide the keys to the disguises. We show h o w to use a single key to generate multiple keys which are independent" and which simplify the mechanics of the disguise techniques. This key is analogous to the key in encryption but the techniques are di erent.
The following simple example illustrates the di erence between encryption and disguise. Consider a string F of text characters that are each represented by a n i n teger from 1 to 256 i.e., these are byte strings. Suppose that F 1 is an encryption of F with one of the usual algorithms. Suppose that F 2 is a disguise of F that is created as follows: 1 Choose a seed the disguise key for a uniform random number generator and create a sequence G of random integers between 0 and 128, 2 Set F 2 = F 1 + G. Assume now that F is a constant the single value 69 string of length N and the agent wishes to discover the value of this constant. It is not possible to discover from F 1 the value 69 no matter how large N is. However, it is possible to discover 69 from F 2 if N is large enough. Since G is uniform, the mean of the values of G converge to 64 as N increases and thus, as N increases, the mean of F 2 converges to 133 = 64 + 69 and the rate of convergence is order 1= p N. Thus, when 1= p N is somewhat less than 1=2, we know that the mean of F 2 is 133 and that the character is 69. An estimate of N is obtained by requiring that 128= p N be less than 1=2
or N be more than about 60 70,000. The point of this example is that the encription cannot be broken in this case without knowing the encryption key | even if one knows the encryption method. However, the disguise can be broken without knowing the key provided the disguise method is known. Of course, it follows that one should not use such a simplistic disguise and we provide disguise techniques for scienti c computations with security comparable to that of the most secure encryptions.
Four Simple Examples
The nature and breadth of the disguises possible are illustrated by the following.
Matrix Multiplication
Consider the computation of the product of two n n matrices M 1 and M 2 . We use x;y to denote the Kronecker delta function that equals 1 if x = 1 and 0 if x 6 = y. The disguise requires six steps:
1. Create i three random permutations 1 , 2 , and 3 of the integers f1; 2; : : : ; n g, and ii three sets of non-zero random numbers f 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n g, f 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n g, and f 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n g.
2.
Create matrices P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 where P 1 i; j = 1 1 i;j , P 2 i; j = i 2 i; j , and P 3 i; j = k 3 i;j . These matrices are readily invertible, e.g., P ,1 1 i; ju = j ,1 This disguise applies the problem's mathematical oerator to a known function and then combines the real and the arti cial problems. Here one must determine 12 random numbers to break the disguise.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the general framework for disguise of scienti c problems is presented including atomic disguise techniques, key management and programming" disguises. The detailed speci cations of these disguises are given in Appendix A. Section 3 presents applications of these techniques to ve broad areas of scienti c computation. The details for these applications are given in Appendix B. The security of disguises is analyzed in Section 4 for attacks using statistical, approximation theoretic and symbolic code analysis methods.
